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Abstract 
 
The paper estimates the distributional implications of income tax evasion in Hungary based 
on a random sample of administrative tax records of 230 thousand individuals. Gross incomes 
in the administrative tax records are compared with those in a nationally representative 
household budget survey, assuming that tax-evaders are more likely to report their true 
incomes in an anonymous interview. Our estimates show that the average rate of 
underreporting is 11%, which conceals large differences between self-employed (who hide 
the majority of their incomes) and employees. The estimates are likely to be lower bound, due 
to measurement error in the income survey. These rates are then used in EUROMOD, a tax-
benefit microsimulation model to calculate the fiscal and distributional implications of 
underreporting, while taking account of all major direct taxes and cash benefits and also their 
interactions. Tax evasion reduces fiscal revenues from personal income taxes by about 19%. 
While the occurrence of poverty is not affected, income inequality becomes significantly 
higher (the Gini coefficient increases by 7%), suggesting that high earners tend to evade 
proportionately more. Finally, we find that tax evasion largely reduces the progressivity of the 
tax system.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Tax evasion obviously interferes with the evaluation of tax policy changes. In addition, where 
the practice of assessing eligibility to benefits relies on a scrutiny of tax returns, tax evasion 
will also cause target inefficiency in the form of benefit “leakage” to ineligible recipients. For 
these reasons, ignoring tax evasion can seriously misjudge the distributive and fiscal effect of 
changes in social benefits and the tax system. In this light, we aim to explore a procedure to 
correct income data for tax evasion.  
The aim of the paper is to provide preliminary estimates of the size and distribution of income 
underreporting and thus tax evasion in Hungary. The paper takes advantage of access to a 
random sample of income tax returns reporting on incomes earned in 2005, containing 
information on 227.688 individuals, about 5,4% of total taxpayers, provided to one of the 
authors by the tax authority.   
 
The level of income taxes is high in Hungary, but a large proportion of the population does 
not pay these in full. The bottom 80% of taxpayers pays altogether only 20% of the personal 
income tax (Krekó and P. Kiss 2007, p. 26). In order to design a fair income redistributive 
system, policy makers need to know not only the incomes of the individuals, but also how 
they actually comply with the tax regulations. Currently, very little is known on the latter. 
This paper uses administrative tax records, thus provides novel results on the extent and 
distribution of income tax evasion. 
 
Tax compliance may be low for two reasons in the country. The first is an attitudinal reason: 
low trust in the political system, little public awareness on the cost of public services and the 
budget policy as such (e.g. Csontos et al. 1998), and the low perceived quality of public 
services (Hanousek and Palda 2004).  
  
We find that the average rate of underreporting is 11% on average, including around 65% of 
the self-employed and 3% of employees. However these estimates are lower bound, due to 
measurement error in the income survey. Tax evasion reduces government revenues from 
personal income taxes by about 19% and significantly increases income inequality and 
reduces the progressivity of the tax system.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on tax evasion in 
Hungary. Section 3 explains the main features of tax policy, with special focus on 
entrepreneurs. Section 4 presents the data and section 5 the main results. Last, section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2 Literature 
 
Why do people evade taxes? Or rather, why do people pay taxes at all? While classical theory 
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972) was preoccupied with the former question, recently the latter 
one has received increasing attention (see e.g. the overview of Andreoni et al. 1998). There is 
a great discrepancy between the standard theoretical model and actual compliance, the former 
predicting greater non-compliance than observable in the real world. Given that audit 
probability is rather low in general, Expected Utility Theory (using audit probability, penalty 
rate and expected return on evading the tax in the model) predicts the expected return on tax 
evasion between 91 and 98%, implying that all taxpayers should hide some income (Dhami 
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and al-Nowaihi 2007). Psychological factors or moral preferences, including loss aversion, 
stigma, guilt, shame or sense of duty, might explain why it is not the case.  
 
A growing strand of authors criticize the traditional neoclassical model of tax compliance, 
where the tax-payer is treated as an isolated and amoral individual and present evidence that 
tax evasion is an interdependent decision, and is greatly influenced by social norms and social 
interactions (Fortin et al. 2007; Frey and Torgler 2007). If taxpayers believe tax evasion to be 
common, tax evasion decreases.  
 
The institutional framework of tax compliance also merits more attention, including the 
structure, the functioning of the tax authority, its setting within the government, and its 
dynamic, repetitive interaction with the taxpayers (Andreoni et al 1998). The quality of 
political institutions (accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of corruption) was shown to have positive observable effect on 
tax morale (Frey and Torgler 2007). Entrepreneurs were found to go underground not to avoid 
taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption (Friedman et al 2000).  
 
There are three main methods of measuring tax compliance, which may be called indirect 
approach, direct approach and the modelling approach (Schneider and Enste 2000; Frey and 
Schneider 2001). The indirect approaches are mostly based on macroeconomic data. Possible 
indicators include the discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics, the 
discrepancy between official and actual labour force, the currency demand approach and the 
electricity consumption method. Direct methods, on the other hand, are based on micro 
datasets. They could include specific surveys or tax auditing data. The modelling approach, 
developed by Frey, focuses on the causes and effects of the undergrounds economy, and 
builds on a behavioural model. This requires a large amount of data, which are often not 
available. In our paper, we are using a direct method.  
 
Direct methods seem to be better suited for Eastern European countries. Hanousek and Palda 
(2006) express a rather critical view about macro approaches measuring tax evasion in 
transition economies (e.g. money demand and electricity demand equations), and plea for the 
use of direct methods. They argue that the pace of change of the parameters of the money 
demand and electricity demand equations is too variable for these methods, demonstrating 
with data for the Czech Republic for the period between 1990 and 2000.  
 
The direct approach has been used by Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005) for Italy and by Matsaganis 
and Flevotomou (2008) for Greece, with similar basic assumptions as in this paper. These 
analyses were based on comparing incomes reported in administrative tax records and income 
survey, assuming that people might consider declaring a closer-to-true income to an 
anonymous interviewer.  They focused on the active population only, and measured only 
income tax evasion, not that of social security contributions or VAT.  
 
 
Existing evidence on the shadow economy in Hungary 
 
The share of the underground (or shadow) economy1 is rather high in Hungary in European 
comparison, ranging between 18 and 25% in 1999-2000 (Schneider and Klinglmair 2004). 
                                               
1
 Economic underground (our focus in this paper) consists of activities that are productive in an economic sense 
and quite legal, but which are deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to avoid the payment of 
taxes or social security contributions. It includes underreporting of production, (understating of revenues or 
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This places the country into a group of high evaders together with other former Communist 
countries, but also Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy. 
 
The calculations of Christie et al. (2005) provide one of the few recent comparative evidence 
on the extent of tax evasion. Their approach is particularly relevant to us, as they include both 
Personal Income Taxes (PIT) and Social Security Contributions (SSC) for the estimation of 
tax evasion. Their fundamental assumption was that tax evasion is uniform across all income 
groups (as they had no access to individual tax records). Our paper aims to relieve this latter 
assumption and explores differences across population groups. They found a higher 
compliance for PIT than for SSC in Hungary: while SSC compliance was 64%, PIT 
compliance reached 70% in 2002 (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Income tax evasion in European countries 
Country SSC Compliance, % PIT Compliance, % 
SSC Theoretical 
Effective Rate, % 
PIT Theoretical 
Effective Rate, % Year 
Austria 91 75 14,1 19,0 2003 
Belgium 69 70 10,9 25,4 2002 
Czech Republic 67 77 12,8 12,1 2003 
Estonia  56  21,6 2003 
France 72 60 3,8 16,5 1999 
Germany 84 75 17,8 17,7 2002 
Hungary 64 70 8,5 21,1 2002 
Italy 83 62 6,0 22,7 2002 
Latvia 53 45 6,8 18,9 2002 
Netherlands  73  13,3 1998 
Poland  66  18,6 1998 
Portugal 66 68 7,7 12,1 2002 
Slovakia 69 56 10,2 11,2 2002 
UK 65 78 5,4 16,9 2002* 
Note: *UK fiscal year: 6 April 2002 - 5 April 2003 
Source: Christie et al. 2005 
 
Semjén et al (2008), based on attitudinal survey questions, find that about 15% of all 
respondents received a share of their income cash-in-hand and 14% received part of their 
wage incomes as enterprise income. Altogether 26% of the respondents evaded some of their 
income taxes in 2006 and 2007.  
 
Elek et al (2009) estimate the share of unregistered employment to 16-17% of the labour 
force, based on the comparison of administrative (pension insurance registry data) and survey 
data for 2001-2004. They find that in 2003 about 50-60% of those reporting minimum wage 
underreported their incomes and on average received about one-third of their actual income as 
“envelope wages”. 
 
 
3 Data  
 
Our estimation of income underreporting is based on two datasets: a random sample of 
unaudited administrative tax records and the Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, both containing data on the 2005 incomes.   
                                                                                                                                                   
overstating costs), and also intentionally not registering (whole enterprises or parts of a registered enterprise). 
For a discussion of the concepts and their definitions, see the1993 SNA (System of National Accounts) and the 
OECD Handbook for the Measurement of the Non-Observed Economy. 
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The sample of administrative tax records (also referred to as APEH, reflecting the name of the 
tax authority) includes 227.688 individuals, about 5,4% of total taxpayers in the country2. The 
data refer to annual incomes from 2005. The sample size falls to 217,530 in the sample used 
for analysis. We top-coded the dataset by excluding those taxpayers who have incomes (any 
type of income) above the highest value in the survey data.3 We also excluded taxpayers with 
zero taxable income4. The tax records include some socio-demographic characteristics of 
individuals, including age, sex, ZIP code, and for a smaller sub-sample the number of 
dependants, and occupation.  
 
The HBS dataset includes 24.549 individuals in 9058 households. Income data is collected 
from household members aged 16 and over, while demographic information is available on all 
members. The income reference period is the calendar year of 2005.5   
 
The results of the analysis crucially depend on the comparability of the two datasets: both in 
terms of the target population and in terms of income. Initially we thus assessed the 
comparability as such. 
 
The main differences of the survey data and the administrative data include the following: (1) 
HBS is based on voluntary participation, while the filing of tax records is a legal obligation 
for those with taxable incomes; (2) under-sampling of high-income households may be 
present in the HBS due to non-response, thus underestimating top incomes and the extent of 
inequality; (3) incomes in the HBS are self-reported, thus recall errors might occur 
(respondents not remembering correctly). 
 
The datasets, however, prove to be similar in crucial aspects: (1) both include personal 
incomes with reference to the calendar year of 2005, and incomes are measured on an annual 
basis (rather than e.g. on a monthly basis); (2) information on gross income is available in 
both; (3) both datasets include basic demographic information on respondents, including sex, 
age, region, employment status (employee or self-employed). These features ensure that the 
two datasets are actually comparable.  
 
We created a comparable reference population in the two datasets, by (1) assuring the 
representativeness of the tax records sample, and by (2) reconciling the taxpayer population 
identified in the two datasets. 
 
                                               
2
 There were only 4,37 million taxpayers in 2005, 44% of the total population, out of which 4,2 million had tax 
base taxed under the progressive tax system (APEH 2006). This later is our reference population. 
3
 In order to exclude outliers from the Tax Audit data we excluded taxpayers with total income tax base above 
26,88 million HUF, wage income above 19,67 million HUF, self-employment income above 24 million HUF 
and other taxable income above 7,21 million HUF. The number of these excluded observations is not substantial, 
altogether make up about 0,2% of the sample. 
4
 We use a broad definition of taxable income including income subject to the progressive tax scheme + 
separately taxed self-employment income (tax base of Simplified Business Tax is not included). Note that other 
separately taxed income, such as capital income is not included in the analysis. That is why we excluded those 
with zero taxable income in order not to include taxpayers with only capital income in the sample.  
5
 According to National Statistical Office high income households are underrepresented and low income 
households are overrepresented in the HBS, therefore average income is somewhat underestimated based on the 
HBS (KSH 2004, pp. 29.)  
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First, we thus reweighted the tax records sample on the basis of aggregate data on the entire 
population of taxpayers. The weights were calculated on the basis of region and employment 
status.  
 
Second, the reweighted tax sample had to be reconciled with the HBS by restricting the latter 
sample to taxpayers. We thus reduced the HBS sample to those who had positive taxable 
income and declared to have filed a tax report6. This reduces the sample size to 9313. This is a 
good approximation of Hungarian taxpayers, because most social incomes, including 
pensions, universal family benefits and other cash transfers, were tax exempt and not reported 
to the tax authorities in 2005. It also implies that pensioners are only included if they have 
employment incomes (besides pensions). The pension, however, remained tax exempt in this 
case.  
 
 
4 Methodology 
 
Our aim is to assess the distributional implications of income tax evasion which is a result of 
income underreporting to tax authorities. For this, we construct a distribution of „true 
income”, as observed in the income survey, and a synthetic distribution of “reported income”, 
assumed to be revealed to tax authorities, also based on the HBS survey, but corrected for 
income under-reporting using information derived from the income tax records. The main 
methodological problem we have to overcome is that there is no single dataset that includes 
both the “true” and the reported taxable income of individuals. If their joint distribution f(yr, 
yd, X), was observable, we could analyse its various features through summary statistics. yr is 
true taxable
 
income, yd is reported taxable income and X is individual characteristics.  
 
In the real world, such joint distributions are not observable. What we observe are two 
distributions in separate datasets, often measured for separate populations, and also often with 
measurement error. There is no trivial way therefore to re-create the joint distribution to 
connect them. Our aim here is to devise a method that allows us to re-generate one of the 
distributions in a dataset where only the other is observed. 
 
Assume first that we have two datasets, where true and reported incomes are measured 
without error and in both datasets we are able to observe some individual characteristics X. 
This gives us two distributions: the true and declared taxable income: f(yr, X) and g(yd, X). 
Clearly, the only information connecting these distributions is the information contained in 
the X variables. If we are to successfully connect these distributions, we have to make use of 
X.  
 
We define both income categories as a function of some individual characteristics, where 
Yd(X) is the distribution of declared income, Yr(Z) is the distribution of true taxable income 
and X and Z are non-exclusive sets of individual characteristics. We can use the common 
variables in X and Z to impute the relationship of the two income categories.  
 
We can estimate declared taxable income from the tax returns data as a function of the 
common set of individual characteristics (xi): 
 
ydi = α + βxi+ εi   (2) 
                                               
6
 The variable indicating the amount of “tax liabilities” was not a missing value.  
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Then from (2) we have αˆ  and βˆ . According to the standard OLS case if there is measurement 
error, due to omitted variables, then αˆ  and βˆ  will be biased. 
 
By using αˆ  and βˆ  the imputed declared income measure in the HBS dataset can be 
calculated by: 
 
diyˆ =αˆ + βˆ xih      (3) 
 
where xih is the individual characteristics in the HBS dataset. 
 
 
In case we are working with a set of indicator variables, estimating (2) in the tax returns data 
is equivalent to calculating population averages for subgroups defined by this set of variables. 
This way estimating declared income in the survey dataset (3) becomes  
 
yd= π1D1+ π2D2+…+e    (5) 
 
where Di-s are the dummies for the subgroups defined by the individual characteristics 
(region, agegroup, sex) and ipi -s will be equal to group average reported incomes. 
 
We would like to estimate the relationship of yd and yr (τ, income underreporting):  
τ= yd//yr     (6)  
 
with heterogeneity in τ. 
 
Using (5) we have 
iτˆ = ( 1pi D1+ 2pi D2+…)/ yri     (7) 
or 
iτˆ = 1pi D1/ yri + 2pi D2/ yri +…     (8) 
 
If the same Di-s are defined in the 2 datasets (same set of individual characteristics are 
observable), τˆ will be defined for each population subgroup and will be equal to the ratio of 
average reported income and average true income in the given subgroup. 
 
Based on the above, our estimation strategy is the following. 7 First we defined comparable 
income categories in the two datasets: gross personal taxable income. It is gross, thus before 
the payment of taxes. It is personal, rather than household level, which adequately matches 
the individual based taxation system in Hungary. It is taxable, thus it refers to positive 
incomes subject to tax. Thus, we only included taxpayers in the sample who had positive total 
income (in both datasets).8 
                                               
7
 On the features of the Hungarian tax policy see Annex B. 
8
 We defined the following variables on the two datasets:  
- Wage income: this is part of the tax base of the progressive tax scheme 
- Self-employment income: sum of wage income form self-employment (the tax base of the progressive 
tax scheme) and other income from self-employment (regarded as capital income in the Hungarian tax system). 
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As pensions and benefits are exempt from tax, we did not include them in our definition of the 
taxable income. Capital incomes (other than income from self-employment) are not included 
in the definition of incomes used here9.  
 
We assume that “true taxable income” is reported in the income survey and “reported taxable 
income” is revealed to the tax authority. Based on the survey income we construct a synthetic 
distribution of reported income by adjusting survey income of each individual for 
underreporting with adjustment factors calculated for each subgroup. We calculate these 
adjustment factors by comparing the average tax returns income to the average survey income 
for a given subgroup, separately for wage income, self-employment income and other income. 
The common set of individual characteristics that we can use for defining these subgroups is 
very limited: we only have age group, gender and region, but age and gender are usually 
endogenous with income. Using all the 3 variables we can define 70 (5*2*7) subgroups 
(“cells”) whereas using only region gives only 7 subgroups.  
 
It is important to note that in our analysis we were not concerned about the employment status 
of the individual (employed or self-employed) but the part of income coming from the 
different sources. We calculated reported income for the part of income coming from wage 
and self-employment sources separately and then added up these figures for total declared 
income. Later on when we refer to “self-employed” (rather than self-employment income), we 
use our definition of self-employed rather than a self declared status. We regarded those 
taxpayers self-employed who declared at least 1 forint (HUF) of any kind of self-employment 
income in 2005. 
 
Our results crucially depend on the assumption that tax evaders have no incentive to conceal 
their true income when responding to an income survey. Some papers (e.g. Fiorio and 
D’Amuri (2005)) argue for this assumption whereas others, especially those using the 
consumption-based approach to estimate income underreporting (e.g. Pissarides and Weber 
(1989), Lyssiotou et al (2004)) suppose that income in surveys is unreliable. Even these 
studies use a group of individuals as reference population, for whom they suppose that 
reported income is real. Normally this reference population is the employed and they calculate 
income underreporting of the self-employed compared to them.  
 
We assume that survey incomes are “true”, at least there are weaker incentives to underreport 
income in an anonymous survey than to the tax authorities. In case income is underreported in 
the HBS, our estimate of underreporting will be lower bound estimates. 
 
 
5 Results  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
- Other taxable income: other income components that are part of the tax base of the progressive tax 
scheme, except wage income from self-employment  
- Total income is the sum of wage income, self-employment income and other taxable income. 
9
 Also note that those income that are not part of the tax base but increases the total tax liability (adoterhet nem 
viselo jarandosagok) are not part of our total taxable income either. The reason is that the information on these 
items in the HBS is insufficient. However this does not affect our results substantially as in 2005 pension was 
completely tax free and GYES was exclusive of wage income, so the sum of these types of income is very 
limited. 
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According to our calculations, income underreporting rate is 9-13%, when all three 
explanatory variables (age, gender and region) are used (see Table 3). With respect to income 
types, wage income is underreported by some 4%, self-employment income by about 73% 
and other income by 10%.10  
 
The extent of income underreporting is not uniform across income groups, but the highest in 
the richest two deciles (about 11-21%) and around the minimum wage (second decile, ca. 
10%). Thus, the rich benefit the most from income tax evasion, not only in monetary value 
but also as a proportion of their incomes.  
  
 
Table 3. Underreporting by level of income under different specifications 
Income decile 
of taxpayers 
Mean 
„true” 
income 
 
Rate of underreporting 
  (1) 
explanatory 
var.s: region, 
agegr, gender – 
not topcoded 
(2) 
explanatory 
var.s: region, 
agegr, gender – 
topcoded 
(3) 
explanatory var.: 
region – 
not topcoded 
(4) 
explanatory var.: 
region – 
topcoded 
1 (poorest) 301 -8% 5% 1% 4% 
2 694 4% 10% 8% 10% 
3 90 1% 7% 5% 7% 
4 1090 1% 6% 4% 5% 
5 1265 2% 7% 4% 6% 
6 1460 5% 9% 7% 8% 
7 1719 6% 9% 7% 8% 
8 2053 6% 9% 7% 9% 
9 2634 11% 13% 11% 12% 
10 (richest) 4645 19% 21% 19% 19% 
Total 1676 9% 13% 10% 11% 
Notes:  
Reported Income = Adjustment Factor * True Income  
underreporting=(True income-Reported Income)/True Income 
Top-coded means that adjustment factors are maximised to 1, not allowing income overreporting. 
Mean income by income group is annual gross personal income in thousand forints. “True” income is as 
observed in the HBS dataset. Income quantiles of taxpayers were generated based on “true” income, excluding 
those earning zero or negative incomes. 
 
 
We estimate reported income for all taxpayers by applying our adjustment factors - the 
estimated rate of income underreporting - to HBS taxable income measures. We find that 
underreporting is quite different for different population groups. Self-employed11 tend to 
underreport most: about two thirds of their incomes are not reported as a tax base to the tax 
authority. In contrast, employees seem to comply with tax rules at large, with an overall rate 
of underreporting of 4% (Table 4).  
 
Underreporting is the highest in the highest income region, Central Hungary (including 
Budapest). This may be explained with the higher share of economic sectors particularly 
                                               
10
 As mentioned in footnote 5 average income is underestimated in the HBS, therefore our results are lower 
bound estimates.  
11
 We define self-employed as those who earned at least 1 HUF of any kind of self-employment income in the 
reference period. 
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prone to tax evasion. Much of the construction industry and the service sector can be found 
around the capital, in the highest income region. It is followed by a rich (West-Transdanubia) 
and a poor (South Great Plain) region. 
 
Tax evasion is higher among men and somewhat increases by age, especially for people 
around the retirement age.  This is partly a composition effect: (i) men tend to be over twice 
as frequently entrepreneurs than women, (ii) there are more self-employed among those aged 
60 or over than in younger age groups. Our calculations also show that men underreport both 
wage income and self-employment income more than women do and the elderly underreport 
more. Based on a specific survey on Hungary, Tóth (2008) also finds that men tend to 
underreport wages more than women, while he concludes that envelope wages are more 
widespread among young and middle-aged people than the old.  
 
 
Table 4. Underreporting by main source of income, region, age and gender  
 Population 
share "True income" 
Calculated reported 
income 
Rate of 
underreporting 
Employment status    
Wage earners 90% 1603 1542 4% 
Self-employed 10% 2325 770 67% 
Region     
Central Hungary 31% 2166 1787 17% 
Central Transdanubia 11% 1488 1376 7% 
West-Transdanubia 12% 1549 1347 13% 
South Transdanubia 7% 1396 1274 9% 
North Hungary 12% 1431 1355 5% 
North Great Plain 13% 1402 1278 9% 
South Great Plain 14% 1468 1289 12% 
Gender     
Male 50% 1898 1575 17% 
Female 50% 1455 1354 7% 
Age group     
0-14 0% 1138 230 80% 
15-29 18% 1264 1144 10% 
30-44 yrs 39% 1739 1496 14% 
45-59 yrs 41% 1802 1589 12% 
60+ yrs 2% 1686 1313 22% 
Notes:  
Reported Income = Adjustment Factor * True Income  
Rate of underreporting=(True income-Reported Income)/True Income 
Here we present results for the case where region, agegroup and gender are used as explanatory variables and 
adjustment factors are topcoded. Topcoded means that adjustment factors are maximised to 1, not allowing 
income overreporting. 
Mean income by income group is annual gross personal income in thousand forints. “True” income is as 
observed in the HBS dataset. Income quantiles of taxpayers were generated based on “true” income, excluding 
those earning zero or negative incomes. 
 
In order to see the potential effects of tax evasion we make use of a microsimulation model 
that can take into account interactions of the elements of the tax and benefit system. Therefore 
in the next step we apply the estimated adjustment factors in the tax-benefit microsimulation 
model (EUROMOD) in order to calculate how income underreporting affects tax revenues, 
progressivity and the distribution of incomes. The total synthetic reported income for each 
individual comprises the sum of the synthetic reported wage income and synthetic reported 
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self-employment income. Income underreporting can therefore be calculated by comparing 
the survey taxable income to this total synthetic reported income.   
 
Table 6. Adjustment factors used in the microsimulation model by region and type of income 
 Employment income Self-employment income 
Central Hungary 0,960 0,211 
Transdanubia 1,000 0,288 
Great Plain and North 0,990 0,342 
Notes: The estimated adjustment factors for employment income in Transdanubia was recoded to 1, thus 
excluding the possibility of over-reporting to the tax authorities. 
Since information is available only for three main regions (NUTS1 level) and two main types of income in the 
microsimulation database (EU-SILC), the number of adjustment factors was limited to six. 
 
Income underreporting as such modifies total household incomes, but the impact is largely 
dependent on the tax system and also on the system of cash benefits. The use of a tax-benefit 
model allows us to account for (i) the complexity of the tax system, including the fact that 
only some income components are subject to tax, while others are not, (ii) a potential 
interaction between specific cash and tax policies (benefit entitlements may also change as a 
result of tax evasion).  
 
We aim to estimate the distribution of “net income”, calculating net incomes in the following 
way.  
 
Ynet = Yreported * (1- t) + Yhidden + Ysocial 
 
Where Ynet is total personal disposable income for individual i, Yreported  refers to reported 
income, t is the total tax rate, Yhidden is the income not-reported to the tax authority, and Ysocial 
is the amount of social transfers received by individual i. Note that in the Hungarian case 
Yreported consists of only labour income (and not social benefits), and Ysocial is non-taxable, 
with the exception of insurance-based maternity benefits, which are included in labour 
incomes. 
 
Next we present our calculations based on EUROMOD, the European tax-benefit 
microsimulation model (see Lietz and Mantovani 2007, Lelkes and Sutherland 2009) 12. This 
model includes all major direct tax and cash benefit policies in 2005, thus allows us to 
consider the complexity and interaction of these. In addition to the policy rules, the model 
includes a nationally representative household dataset, which enables the user to assess the 
impact of specific policy measures (or their changes) on the total population. In our case, we 
do not model policy change as such, but rather a change in one of the basic assumption of 
microsimulation models, that of full compliance. Using our adjustment factors for income 
underreporting we are able to assess the impact of tax evasion on the budget, but also on 
individuals’ incomes and their distribution. 
 
Table 7. Fiscal and distributional implications of tax evasion 
  Full compliance Tax evasion Difference 
                                               
12
 This paper uses EUROMOD, the European tax-benefit microsimulation model, as a means for estimating the 
incidence of income tax evasion. The EUROMOD is based on the EU SILC, therefore using the same dataset, 
instead of the HBS dataset for estimating underreporting would have been a logical choice. However our 
preliminary calculations showed that income data is not detailed enough in the EU SILC for our analysis, which 
hindered the comparison with the tax audit data. Thus, we concluded that using the HBS data for underreporting 
estimates and using the EU-SILC based microsimulation model for distribution analysis is more appropriate. 
 12
Personal income tax receipts (billion HUF, annual) 1.119 902 -19,4% 
Poverty line (HUF, monthly) 45.279 46.822 3,4% 
Poverty rate (FGT a=0) 14,8 14,6 not sign. 
Poverty gap (FGT a=1) 3,4 3,3 not sign 
Gini 0,274 0,292 6,8% 
S80/S20 4,020 4,320 7,5% 
Atkinson e=0.5 0,064 0,076 17,9% 
Atkinson e=2 0,235 0,253 7,6% 
Theil 0,139 0,173 24,5% 
Kakwani 0,259 0,231 -10,8% 
Reynolds-Smolensky 0,073 0,053 -26,9% 
Suits 0,294 0,254 -13,5% 
Notes: full compliance provides estimates of income tax variables assuming incomes are reported to tax 
authorities as observed in the EU-SILC. Tax evasion provides estimates of the same variables assuming incomes 
are under-reported to tax authorities by the adjustment factors shown in Table 6. FGT refer to the Foster Greer 
Thorbecke family of poverty indices. 
Income concept:  equivalised household income, monthly. 
Difference in the poverty rates and the poverty gaps under the two scenarios are not statistically significant. 
The actual amount of personal income tax receipts in the state budget was 1.207 billion forints in 2005 (APEH 
2006). It includes tax on other types of incomes (e.g. agricultural incomes, intellectual activities) which are not 
measured accurately in the EU-SILC survey. 
 
The fiscal implications of tax evasion are substantial; the “tax gap”, the difference between 
the taxes households actually owe and what they report, equals about 220 billion forints. 
Revenues fall short by about 19%. This figure is somewhat higher than the Ministry of 
Finance estimate, quoted by the World Bank report (World Bank, 2008) which estimates the 
tax gap to be above 10%. The microsimulation model somewhat underestimates the total 
budget revenue from income taxes, which was 1.207 billion forints in 2005 (APEH 2006), 
due to data limits. For specific income types, the number of observations is very small, for 
some others, there are measurement errors (e.g. property incomes, agricultural incomes, 
intellectual activities). On the other hand, certain tax rules (especially tax credits) are 
simplified in the model, as there is no adequate information in the income survey (e.g. on 
donations to charities). These modelling features, however, are not likely to affect the 
estimated implications of tax evasion as such, as they are expected to affect the results under 
both scenarios equally.  
 
Income inequality is significantly higher under tax evasion. The Gini coefficient and the 
quintile ratio increase by 7-8%. Similarly, the Atkinson index also rises for both alternative 
values of the inequality aversion parameter13. This has two major implications. First, high 
earners tend to evade proportionately more, and second, progressivity of the tax system is 
lower under tax evasion than implied by the tax legislation. This is confirmed by the 
indicators measuring progressivity.   
 
Tax evasion reduces the progressivity of the income tax system to a rather large extent. All 
indices of progressivity suggest that income tax evasion reduces progressivity. The Kakwani 
and Suits indices indicate a decline of 11-14%, while the Reynolds-Smolensky an even 
greater, 27% fall. In these calculations we consider the impact of both personal income taxes 
and social security contributions, thus all taxes on labour at the employee level. Note that we 
                                               
13
 Note that the extent of the change is greater when the inequality aversion parameter is smaller (e=0.5), when 
less weight is attached by the society to redistribution to the poor. (The potential range of e is from 0, which 
means that the society is indifferent to the redistribution, to infinity, where the society is concerned only with the 
position of the poorest income group.) 
 13
measure progressivity of (equivalised) household incomes, rather than personal incomes. 
Equivalised household income is a better proxy for individual resources, as individuals live in 
households and share incomes. The use of (equivalised) household income for measuring tax 
progressivity is clearly a virtue of tax benefit microsimulation models as normally 
information on tax payments (e.g. in tax records) cannot be linked to household structures or 
other sources of household incomes. 
 
By international comparison, the estimated tax evasion in Hungary is rather high, but not 
outstanding. In Greece, the tax gap with respect to personal income taxes was found to be 
25% (Matsaganis and Flevotomou 2008). The tax gap (of all federal taxes, not simply income 
taxes as in our case) in the US was estimated to be 17% in the early 1990’s, and found to be 
relatively unchanged in the past 20 years (Andreoni et al 1998). Non-compliance was 
calculated using data from intensive audits conducted on a stratified random sample of tax 
returns. One third of taxpayers were found to underreport their incomes.  
 
An important implication of our results is that tax evasion is not uniform across social groups 
therefore tax authorities can target audits to certain groups in order to increase efficiency. We 
do no assess, however, how taxpayers may react to policy changes. Bakos et al. (2008) 
analyzed taxpayer behaviour using the 2005 tax reform which changed marginal and average 
tax rates but kept tax enforcement constant. They assessed the impact of tax changes on 
taxable income and found that tax elasticity is high for mid- and high-income earners and 
state that it might come from high responsiveness of income tax evasion to tax rates. As 
shown in this paper, tax evasion is indeed comparatively high at the top of the income 
distribution. Therefore it is likely that high income earners would react to lower marginal tax 
rate by lowering tax evasion which would then increase budget revenues.   
 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The paper estimated the incidence of income tax evasion in Hungary on the basis of a random 
sample of administrative tax records of 230 thousand individuals, not accessible for research 
so far. Gross incomes in the administrative tax records are compared with those in a 
nationally representative income survey, HBS, assuming that tax-evaders are more likely to 
report their true incomes in an anonymous interview. We estimated income underreporting for 
those who report at least some income to the tax authorities, leaving out those individuals who 
do not declare any of their income. The method we applied in our paper provided the first 
micro-data-based estimates for personal income tax evasion in Hungary.  
 
Our estimates show that the average rate of underreporting is 11%, which conceals large 
differences between the self-employed (who hide the majority of their incomes) and the 
employees. Men are more likely to hide their incomes than women, but it is due to the 
composition effect: the majority of self-employed are men. The rate of underreporting was 
found to be the highest in case of taxpayers at the top of the distribution and those with 
incomes around the minimum wage level. Due to the parameters of the tax system 
(progressive tax scheme and the employee tax credit), the similar rate of underreporting, 
however implies rather different actual tax payments in these two income groups. The 
progressive tax scheme imposes greater relative burden on those with high incomes, and in 
parallel, employee tax credit benefits employees below the average wage. In absolute terms, 
however, the evasion of top earners affects the budget more, as expected. 
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The estimated rates of underreporting are then used in EUROMOD, the European tax-benefit 
microsimulation model to calculate the fiscal and distributional implications of 
underreporting, comparing the scenarios of full compliance to that of tax evasion, while 
taking account of all major direct taxes and cash benefits and their interactions. Tax evasion 
reduces fiscal revenues from personal income taxes by about 19%. While poverty does not 
change under tax evasion, income inequality becomes significantly higher (the Gini 
coefficient and the quintile ratio increase by 7-8%), showing that high earners tend to evade 
proportionately more. This implies that the progressivity of the tax system is lower under tax 
evasion than intended. The effects are rather large, as shown by various indices of 
progressivity, suggesting a decline of 11-26%. As our estimates are likely to be lower bound 
(due to potential measurement error in the income survey), the actual effects of tax evasion on 
the total redistribution are expected to be larger. 
 
In the policy debate, tax evasion is often attributed exclusively to the high level of taxes in 
Hungary, or to a culture of free-riding by citizens. Policy-makers tend to be concerned 
primarily with the fiscal loss arising from tax evasion. Our results contribute with a new 
aspect to this debate: due to the greater ability of high income earners to evade taxes, tax 
evasion tends to increase income inequality. The reduced progressivity of the income tax 
scheme is likely to alter social outcomes from the pursued policy goals, and thus may 
undermine the equity of income redistribution. We have also shown that specific rates of tax 
evasion vary substantially by social groups and these differences alter income inequality, 
poverty and tax progressivity. As long as tax evasion prevails, informed policy decisions 
aiming to promote social welfare need to consider its implications. 
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Annex A. Descriptive and summary statistics 
 
Table A1. Main characteristics of the taxpayers in administrative and survey datasets 
Number of observation 
APEH     HBS    
regions employed entrepr total  regions employed entrepr total 
Central Hungary 55097 3465 58562  Central Hungary 2481 378 2859 
Central Transdanubia 18632 1279 19911  Central Transdanubia 963 86 1049 
West Transdanubia 18017 1266 19283  West Transdanubia 992 123 1115 
South Transdanubia 21320 1314 22634  South Transdanubia 630 55 685 
North Hungary 18977 1148 20125  North Hungary 1070 79 1149 
North Great Plain 24161 1650 25811  North Great Plain 1094 102 1196 
South Great Plain 21556 1577 23133  South Great Plain 1142 118 1260 
Total 177760 11699 189459  Total 8372 941 9313 
 
Share (%)         
APEH employed entrepr total   HBS employed entrepr total 
Central Hungary 29% 2% 31%  Central Hungary 27% 4% 31% 
Central Transdanubia 10% 1% 11%  Central Transdanubia 10% 1% 11% 
West Transdanubia 10% 1% 10%  West Transdanubia 11% 1% 12% 
South Transdanubia 11% 1% 12%  South Transdanubia 7% 1% 7% 
North Hungary 10% 1% 11%  North Hungary 11% 1% 12% 
North Great Plain 13% 1% 14%  North Great Plain 12% 1% 13% 
South Great Plain 11% 1% 12%  South Great Plain 12% 1% 14% 
Total 94% 6% 100%   Total 90% 10% 100% 
         
Number of observation 
APEH employed entrepr total  HBS employed entrepr total 
male 95606 8203 103809  Male 4013 628 4641 
female 108201 5520 113721  Female 4359 313 4672 
Total 203807 13723 217530  Total 8372 941 9313 
 
Share (%)         
         
APEH employed entrepr total   HBS employed entrepr total 
male 44% 4% 48%  Male 43% 7% 50% 
female 50% 3% 52%  Female 47% 3% 50% 
Total 94% 6% 100%   Total 90% 10% 100% 
Notes: 
APEH: administrative data from the tax authority 
HBS: Household Budget Survey 
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 Annex B. Features of the Hungarian tax policy 
 
The income tax system is subject to frequent (mostly annual) changes, including both the tax 
rates and the tax brackets. Some of this might be explained with the indexation to inflation, 
but in most cases they reflect changing policy priorities, at times focusing on raising revenues, 
other times on lowering the tax burden.  
 
Table 2. Personal income tax brackets (in HUF) and rates 
2003  2004  2005  2006  
Tax bracket Rate Tax bracket Rate Tax bracket Rate Tax bracket Rate 
0-650.000 20% 0-800.000 18% 0-1.500.000 18% 0-1.550.000 18% 
650.001- 1.350.000 30% 800.001- 1.500.000 26%     
1.350.001- 40% 1.500.001- 38% 1.500.001- 38% 1.550.001- 36% 
 
In addition to PIT, employers had to pay a total of 32% as social security contributions on 
their labour incomes in 2004. Employee social security contribution amounted to 13,5%. 
These rates had been relatively stable and remained the same between 2004 and 2006. 
 
Budget revenue from personal income taxes made up 6,6% of the GDP in 2005 (European 
Commission 2007). The Hungarian budget however relies heavily on indirect taxes, and 
received about 53% higher amount from VAT than from PIT in 200514.  
 
With respect to the distribution of tax burden in the country: about one third of taxpayers paid 
the higher marginal tax rate of 38% on some of their total incomes in 2005.  
 
                                               
14
 Ministry of Finance, Hungary, Balance sheet of the central government annual budget. Retrieved on 14 
January 2009 from www.pm.gov.hu  
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